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Abstract
An analytical equilibrium model for a simultaneously functioning elec-
tricity market and a market for Green Certificates is formulated. The main
focus is on the eﬀects of changing the percentage requirement, which is
perceived as the policy instrument aﬀecting the level of green electricity
in end use consumption. We start by looking briefly at an autarky market
before opening for trade of electricity and certificates. The results show
that the percentage requirement is a very imprecise instrument as to in-
crease the provision of green electricity. In none of the cases considered
will an increase of the percentage requirement in a country necessarily
result in an increase in the generation of green electricity in the coun-
try itself. When opening for trade, the results show that the increase of
the percentage requirement in one country can have a negative eﬀect on
green electricity generation in this country, but a positive eﬀect in the
other country. Further it is shown that in the case of an open certificate
market where the certificates can be traded at a given international price,
a country will maximize it’s generation of green electricity by setting the
percentage requirement equal to zero.
1 Introduction
The introduction of Green Certificates (GCs) as a means for increasing the gen-
eration of electricity bases on renewable sources (green electricity) is currently
considered in many countries (Sweden, Denmark, UK, Holland, Italy, Belgium,
Australia, USA etc.). GC systems are supposed to be introduced in Sweden and
Denmark in 2003.
In short, the GC market consists of sellers and buyers of certificates. The
sellers are the producers of electricity using renewable sources. The producers
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are each allowed to sell an amount of certificates corresponding to the elec-
tricity they feed into the electricity network. The purchasers of certificates
are consumers/distribution companies that are required by the government to
hold a certain percentage of certificates, from here referred to as the percent-
age requirement, corresponding to their total consumption/end-use deliveries
of electricity.1 The GCs are seen as permits for consuming electricity. Hence,
this system implies that the producers using renewable energy sources receive
both the wholesale price and a certificate for each kWh fed into the electricity
network. In this way the GC system is supposed to induce new investments
in green electricity generation. An additional indirect eﬀect of increasing the
provision of green electricity will be to reduce CO2 emission if the develop-
ment of renewable electricity generation technologies is substituting electricity
generation from fossil fuel fired plants.2
So far, the systems under consideration are mainly thought of as domestic
systems, but the hope and aim is that an international market for GCs will be
realized in the near future. International cooperation, e.g. RECS (Renewable
Energy Certificate System) has been established to look into the possibilities
of establishing an international market for GCs. However, the development of
the national systems have happened relatively fast and it seems like the eﬀects
of a GC system have not yet been fully understood. The economic literature
in this area is still scarce, but some of the contributions show that there are
potential problems connected to the GC system and that the design of these
systems therefore should be made carefully. Research contributions have been
made by e.g. Voogt et al. (1999), Morthorst (2000 and 2001) Amundsen and
Mortensen (2001 and 2002), Amundsen and Nese (2002), Bye et al. (2002) and
Jensen and Skytte (2002). In this paper we will mainly build on the analyses
made by Amundsen and Mortensen and Amundsen and Nese.
Amundsen and Mortensen (2001) looks at the basic features of the proposed
Danish GC system. They identify a number of potential problems connected
to perverse and inconclusive eﬀects on the generation of green electricity from
changes in diﬀerent exogenous variables like the percentage requirement and the
CO2 emission constraint. In their model, the authors derive results for both an
autarky situation and a setting which includes trade of electricity at a given
international wholesale price.
Amundsen and Nese (2002) focus on the eﬀect of market power in a GC
system. Their findings suggest that faced with market power, the GC system
basically collapses into a system of per unit subsidies.
In addition, concerns about lack of liquidity and large price volatility in the
GC market has been expressed by critics of the GC system.
Some of the problems referred to here are to some extent believed to be
related to the size of the GC market. Small markets should be more exposed
to liquidity problems, price volatility and market power than larger markets.
1 Italy is an exception in this respect as the Italian system is supposed to put the purchase
obligation on the producers.
2Electricity based on non-renewable resources will throughout the article be referred to as
black electricity.
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One way to increase the size of the GC market is to open for international trade
of GCs. In addition, an international market should help induce a more cost
eﬃcient development of renewable energy.
A GC-system typically consists of two policy variables, the percentage re-
quirement and the GC-price bounds. The focus of this paper will mainly be
on the percentage requirement. In the proposed GC-systems, the percentage
requirement is perceived as a policy instrument aﬀecting the level of green elec-
tricity in end use consumption. Unlike price-fixation (that leaves quantity an
endogenous variable) or quantity fixation (that leaves price an endogenous vari-
able) the percentage requirement neither fixes price nor quantity and thus leaves
both variables to be endogenously determined. However, some of the articles
mentioned above have shown that it is not in general true that an increase of
the percentage requirement leads to an increased generation of green electricity
in equilibrium. The analyses have, however, so far been done on an autarky
market and on a market with trade of electricity at a given international whole-
sale price. In this paper, we will develop the analysis further by allowing also
for trade of GCs. We will do the analysis step by step, starting by referring the
results for an autarky market. Thereafter we will open for trade of electricity,
trade of GCs, and trade of both electricity and GCs. We will start the analy-
sis of trade by looking at the market from the perspective of a small country,
which has no eﬀect on the international prices of electricity and GCs. Finally,
we will increase the complexity by analyzing trade within the framework of a
two-country model in which the prices of the traded goods are no longer given.
This gives us the possibility to look into the interactions between the two coun-
tries as the prices in one of the countries can be aﬀected by changes in demand
and supply in the other country. In each of these cases, the focus will be on the
eﬀect on the key variables, i.e. generation of black and green electricity, and on
consumption, from an increase of the percentage requirement.
Many of the GC-systems discussed in diﬀerent countries include price bounds
for the GC-price. The introduction of a lower price bound is used in order to
provide the producers of green electricity with a guaranteed minimum price for
their certificates. This means that the producers can produce as many GCs they
want and the State will guarantee that they get paid the minimum price bound.
The upper price bound is meant to provide the consumers with a guarantee
that they will not have to pay an ”unreasonable” high price for their necessary
certificates. At a binding upper price bound the consumers are oﬀered the
possibility to pay a fine equal to the upper price bound to the State instead of
buying GCs. A GC system in which the GC-price is at one of the price bounds
is nothing else than a system of per unit subsidies. In this paper we are using
a long run model, and it does not seem relevant to consider a GC system in
which the GC-price stays at one of the price bounds in the long run. If this is
the case, it should just be replaced by a traditional subsidy scheme. Thus, we
will in the major part of our analysis assume that the GC system is actually
working in the sense that we get a market based price of GCs. However, we
may have a situation where the price bounds are binding for shorter periods.
Therefore, and also for the sake of completeness, we will also briefly discuss the
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importance of the price bounds with respect to our analysis.
We will build on the models developed in the above mentioned articles by
Amundsen and Mortensen, and Amundsen and Nese, to investigate the eﬀect of
introducing trade. The model is an analytic equilibrium model for simultaneous
functioning electricity and GC markets. In the analysis we will assume that
opening the markets will remove potential market power problems. The analysis
therefore assumes perfect competition in both the generation technologies (green
and black), like in Amundsen and Mortensen.
The purpose of this paper is to focus on the eﬀects of changing the policy
parameters under diﬀerent assumptions about the markets involved in the GC-
system. As the GC-system first of all is meant to promote the generation of
green electricity, the major focus will be on how changes in the policy variables
aﬀect this generation. Existing literature have already shown that these eﬀects
are not straight forward in the cases of autarky and trade of electricity at a
given international price. We will investigate if and how these results change
as we also open the market for GCs, not only in the case of a small country
trading at given international prices, but also in the case where the trade is
aﬀecting the prices of electricity and GCs, and the end user prices, within a
two-country model. It turns out that the eﬀect on the generation of green
electricity from changing the percentage requirement in most of the cases will
still be indeterminate. A major result of this paper is that in none of the cases
considered will an increase of the percentage requirement in a country necessarily
result in an increase in the generation of green electricity in the country itself.
Actually, if only GCs can be traded internationally, and if the international
GC-price is given, a country will maximize it’s generation of green electricity by
setting the percentage requirement equal to zero. Among the other surprising
and perverse results is that in the case of trade of electricity in the two-country
model, an increase of the percentage requirement in one country will have an
indeteterminate eﬀect on the generation of green electricity in the country itself,
while it will always induce a an increased generation of green electricity in the
other country. Thus, it turns out that even if opening the markets may have
a positive eﬀect as to reduce the possibility of market power, the percentage
requirement will still be a very imprecise instrument as to aﬀect the level of
green electricity in end use consumption.
The first section of the paper presents the model. The next section presents
and analyses briefly the equilibrium in the case of an autarky market. Section
3 introduces three trade regimes; trade of electricity, trade of GCs, and trade
of both electricity and GCs. In this section, it is assumed that the goods are
traded at given international prices. In section 4, we look at the same three trade
regimes, but this time within the context of a two-country model, in which the
trade aﬀects the prices. Thereafter follows a brief discussion about the other
policy variable of the GC system, the GC-price bounds. Finally, the last section
summarizes and concludes.
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2 The model
The following model is designed to capture a long run situation for the simul-
taneous functioning electricity market and the markets for GCs in the case of
autarky and in the case of trade at given international prices. The variables we
use are defined in Table 1:
Table 1: List of variables for autarky and trade at given international prices
Variable
consumer price of electricity p
GC-price s
wholesale price of electricity q
consumption of electricity x
generation of black electricity y
imported quantity of black electricity m
generation of green electricity (GCs) z
imported quantity of green electricity (GCs) n
percentage of green electricity consumption α
GC demand g
We will apply the following general functions to describe the demand and
supply of electricity and GCs:
The demand for electricity is specified by the following inverse demand func-
tion:
p (x) , with
∂p (x)
∂x
= p
0
(x) < 0.
The cost functions for the producers of black electricity are assumed given
by:
c = c (y) , with c
0
(y) > 0 and c
00
(y) > 0.
The rationale for choosing an increasing long run marginal cost function for
the producers of black electricity is that the expansion of output may drive
up the price of CO2-emission permits or CO2-taxes to comply with national
CO2-emission constraints.
The technologies for green electricity generation is assumed to be specified
by the following cost function:
h = h (z) , with h
0
(z) > 0 and h
00
(z) > 0.
The rationale for choosing increasing long run cost functions for the gen-
eration of green electricity is that good sites for establishing green electricity
generation, e.g. wind-mill parks, may be in scarce supply by nature.
Under autarky, the two groups of generators deliver electricity to a common
wholesale market in each country, from where distribution companies purchase
electricity for end-use deliveries. The distribution companies are throughout
the article assumed to be perfectly competitive and act as profit maximizers.
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As the markets are opened for trade, excess supply of electricity or GCs can be
sold at the international market, while excess demand can be covered through
import of electricity and GCs. We start by looking at the autarky situation.
3 Autarky
Assuming perfect competition in both the electricity and the GC market, all
the profit maximizing market participants are price takers. The producers of
black electricity act as if they jointly maximize the following profit function:
Max π (y) = qy − c (y) , s.t. y ≥ 0.
Of course, the first order condition for an optimum in the competitive mar-
kets state that the wholesale price equals the marginal generation costs. Thus,
we have:
q∗ = c
0
(y) .
For each unit of green electricity generated there will be issued one certificate.
The producers of green electricity will always sell all their certificates and will
earn the wholesale price plus the GC-price per unit of green electricity they
generate. For a given wholesale price and GC-price the generators of green
electricity jointly act as to maximize:
Max π (z) = [q + s] z − h (z) , s.t. z ≥ 0.
The first order condition states that the per unit price received by the pro-
ducers of green electricity equals their marginal costs:
q∗ + s∗ = h
0
(z) ,
For each unit of electricity bought and sold to the end users, the distribution
companies in each country will have to pay the wholesale price plus a proportion
α of the certificate price in accordance with the percentage requirement. Under
the assumption of perfect competition, the distribution companies jointly act as
to maximize:
Max π (x) = px− [q + αs]x.
The first order condition is:
p = q + αs.
In the market for GCs the demand is given by:
g = αx.
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3.1 Autarky equilibrium
Given the objective functions and the first order conditions we can specify the
equilibrium for the markets under autarky. The key variables used in the analy-
sis are the equilibrium price, generated quantities of black and green electricity
and total consumption of electricity. Total consumption of electricity is given
by x = z
∗
α . The quantity constraint implied by the percentage requirement is
sometimes referred to as the allowable consumption level. Assuming that c
0
(y∗)
and h
0
(z∗) are representing the aggregate marginal cost functions, we have the
following result for the key variables in equilibrium under autarky:3
p (x∗) = q∗ + αs∗ (1)
x∗ = y∗ + z∗ =
z∗
α
(2)
q∗ + s∗ = h
0
(z∗) (3)
q∗ = c
0
(y∗) (4)
3.2 Analysis
The percentage requirement, α, is in the proposed GC-systems perceived as a
policy instrument aﬀecting the level of green electricity in end use consumption.
However, as shown in Amundsen and Mortensen (2001), it is not true that
an increase of the percentage requirement necessarily leads to an increase in
the generation of green electricity. It does, however, lead to a reduction in the
generation of black electricity. As the eﬀect on green electricity is indeterminate,
the eﬀect on total electricity generation and consumption is also indeterminate,
i.e. we have
³
dy∗
dα
´
< 0 while sign
³
dz∗
dα
´
and sign
³
dx∗
dα
´
are indeterminate.4
4 Trade at given international prices
In this section we will introduce trade as we look at the three diﬀerent trade
regimes. In the analysis of trade, we will start by looking at trade of only
electricity, then we assume that only GCs can be traded, and finally we analyze
the case where both electricity and GCs can be traded internationally. In this
3The market equilibrium under autarky is as specified in Amundsen and Mortensen (2001,
2002).
4For a formal proof of the general case see Amundsen and Nese (2002). See also Bye et al.
(2002) and Jensen and Skytte (2002) that obtain more structure on the results by applying
specific functions on basically similar models as in Amundsen and Mortensen (2001, 2002),
e.g. how total electricity consumption varies as a function of the percentage requirement.
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section we assume that we look at a small country that has no influence on
international prices.5
4.1 Trade of electricity
We are now assuming that electricity can be traded at an international market.
It is also assumed that there are neither any transaction costs associated by
this trade, nor are there any transmission limits between the markets. As we
look at a small country with no influence on international prices, the wholesale
price can be seen as fixed, represented by qM . We can in this case think of
a common market for electricity in the sense that the generators observe the
market price and then supplies the relevant quantity to the common market.
The distribution companies will then purchase the electricity at the common
market, but the GCs will have to be purchased domestically. The certificates
are only financial assets, so the certificates and the green electricity that has
produced the certificates can be purchased separately. However, in this case
where only electricity can be traded internationally, the demand for GCs must
be covered through green electricity generated domestically.
We will not go through the model specification again as the only change from
the autarky case is that the wholesale price of electricity, q, is now replaced by
the internationally given wholesale price, qM , in the objective functions and the
first order conditions.
4.1.1 Equilibrium for the case of trade of electricity
The possibility of trade of electricity is reflected by the import variable, m∗, in
equation (6). We will then have the following competitive equilibrium solution:
p (x∗) = q∗M + αs
∗ (5)
x∗ = y∗ + z∗ +m∗ =
z∗
α
(6)
q∗M + s
∗ = h
0
(z∗) (7)
q∗M = c
0
(y∗) (8)
4.1.2 Analysis
Focusing on the eﬀect of changing the percentage requirement, Proposition 1
shows that the eﬀect on the generation of green electricity is again indeterminate,
the generation of black electricity is unaﬀected, while the consumption will
decrease from an increase of the percentage requirement.
5These cases have to some extent also been treated in Hansen (2001).
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Proposition 1 In the case of trade of electricity at a given international whole-
sale price, the percentage requirement, α, has the following eﬀects:
³
dy∗
dα
´
= 0,³
dx∗
dα
´
< 0, while sign
³
dz∗
dα
´
is indeterminate.
Proof. First, the given international wholesale price of electricity implies
that the generation of black electricity is not aﬀected by an increase of α, i.e. we
have dy
∗
dα = 0. Then, inserting (7) and (8) into (5) yields the electricity price as a
linear combination of marginal costs of the two groups of generation technologies
in equilibrium, i.e. p (x∗) = (1− α) c0 (y∗) + αh0 (z∗). Take the implicit deriv-
atives of this expression with respect to α and arrive at: dz
∗
dα =
αs∗+x∗(∂p/∂x)
D
and dx
∗
dα =
s∗+x∗αh
00
(z∗)
D , with D =
h
∂p
∂x − α2h
00
(z∗)
i
< 0. Inspection of signs
verifies the above claims.
We can explain the reduced demand by showing that the opposite, i.e. dx
∗
dα ≥
0, would lead to a contradiction. dx
∗
dα ≥ 0 would necessarily imply an increased
demand for green electricity, which again would lead to a higher GC-price.
However, given the constant wholesale price, we see from equation (5) that
this would mean that the end user price also increases. This is obviously a
contradiction as an increased end user price necessarily must imply reduced
electricity demand. Thus, it is obvious that we must have
³
dx∗
dα
´
< 0. The open
electricity market implies, however, that the generation of green electricity can
go in both directions, even if the electricity demand is reduced. The increased
percentage requirement is working as to increase the demand for GCs, while the
reduced electricity demand is working in the other direction. The total eﬀect
on the demand for GCs is therefore indeterminate.
4.2 Trade of GCs
Assume now that only GCs can be traded, while the market for electricity is
closed. Again we want to keep it as simple as possible as we disregard potential
transactions costs associated by the trade of GCs. In this case, the physical
electricity must be sold domestically while the GCs are sold at an international
market at a given GC-price. Note therefore, that the green electricity that
produces the GCs and the GCs are sold at diﬀerent markets. The generators
of green electricity therefore receive the domestic wholesale price for each unit
of physical electricity they sell. In addition, they receive the GC-price from the
international market. Someone will perhaps question the relevance of a system
in which there is trade of GCs, but no trade of electricity. However, as the
GCs are only financial assets, they can be traded between countries without
any physical transmission lines connecting them. This provides possibilities for
countries in diﬀerent parts of the world to utilize potential advantages stemming
from trade of GCs. This can be particularly relevant in this early phase in
which the diﬀerent countries are at very diﬀerent levels with respect to actually
implement such systems. It may then very well be the case that GC systems in
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the beginning are implemented in countries which have no possibilities to trade
electricity between them.
Again, we skip the model exercise as the only change from the autarky model
is the replacement of the autarky GC-price, s, with the internationally given
GC-price sM .
4.2.1 Equilibrium for the case of trade of GCs
The relative share of green electricity generated domestically can now diﬀer from
the percentage requirement due to the possibility of import or export of GCs.
This is reflected by the import variable n in equation (10). The equilibrium in
the case of trade of GCs is then characterized like this:
p (x∗) = q∗ + αsM (9)
x∗ = y∗ + z∗ =
z∗ + n∗
α
(10)
q∗ + sM = h
0
(z∗) (11)
q∗ = c
0
(y∗) (12)
4.2.2 Analysis
In the previous case, a given international wholesale price meant that the gener-
ation of black electricity was unaﬀected by a change in the percentage require-
ment. In this case of trade of GCs, the fixed international GC-price will not
imply the same for the supply of green electricity as the price per unit received
by the producers of green electricity also involves the domestic wholesale price.
Proposition 2 below shows that the generation of green electricity will always
decrease from an increase of the percentage requirement in this case. Actually,
all the key variables will decrease in this case as also the generation of black
electricity and the end use consumption will be reduced.
Proposition 2 In the case of trade of GCs at a given international certificate
price, the percentage requirement, α, has the following eﬀects:
³
dy∗
dα
´
< 0,³
dz∗
dα
´
< 0 and
³
dx∗
dα
´
< 0.
Proof. Inserting (11) and (12) into (9) yields the electricity price as a linear
combination of marginal costs of the two groups of generation technologies in
equilibrium, i.e. p (x∗) = (1− α) c0 (y∗) + αh0 (z∗). Take the implicit derivative
of this expression with respect to α and arrive at: dy
∗
dα =
(1−α)sM+x∗
h
αh
00
(z∗)− ∂p∂x
i
D
with D = ∂p∂x − (1− α) c
00
(y∗)−α2h00 (z∗). Inspection of signs verifies the above
claim. Further, we know that the internationally given GC-price implies that
sM is constant. As
³
dy∗
dα
´
< 0 implies a lower qA, we see from (11) that the per
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unit price received by the producers of green electricity is reduced. Therefore we
have
³
dz∗
dα
´
< 0. Finally,
³
dy∗
dα
´
< 0 and
³
dz∗
dα
´
< 0 implies
³
dx∗
dα
´
< 0.
In contrast to the case of trade of electricity, the reduced wholesale price of
electricity cannot be compensated by an increased GC-price. Therefore, we get
the perverse eﬀect that the generation of green electricity will be reduced if the
government increases the percentage requirement. The increase of α will in this
case of a given GC-price function as an increase of an unit tax on consumption.
This means obviously that the consumption decreases. Actually, in this special
case, the domestic generation of green electricity will be maximized at α = 0.
The producers of green electricity will then obviously sell all their GCs at the
international market at a price equal to sM .
4.3 Trade of electricity and GCs
We will now combine the two previous cases assuming that the markets are open
for trade of both electricity and certificates. In this case both the wholesale price
and the GC-price will be given by the international markets.
4.3.1 Equilibrium for the case of trade of electricity and GCs
The equilibrium solution is in this case characterized like this:
In country A:
p (x∗) = qM + αsM (13)
x∗ = y∗ + z∗ +m∗ =
z∗ + n∗
α
(14)
qM + sM = h
0
(z∗) (15)
qM = c
0
(y∗) (16)
4.3.2 Analysis
With a wholesale price and a GC-price that both are given at the international
market, Proposition 3 shows that a change of the percentage requirement will
not aﬀect the quantities of black and green electricity supplied by the producers
in the small country. The consumption will, however, be reduced.
Proposition 3 In the case of trade of both electricity and GCs at given interna-
tional prices, the percentage requirement, α, has the following eﬀects:
³
dy∗
dα
´
=
0,
³
dz∗
dα
´
= 0 and
³
dx∗
dα
´
< 0.
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Proof. Fixed wholesale and GC-prices obviously means that the price per
unit of black and green electricity received by the producers are unaﬀected by an
increase of the percentage requirement. Thus, we have
³
dy∗
dα
´
= 0 and
³
dz∗
dα
´
=
0. To show the eﬀect on consumption, inserting (15) and (16) into (13) yields
the electricity price as a linear combination of marginal costs of the two groups
of generation technologies in equilibrium, i.e. p (x∗) = (1− α) c0 (y∗)+αh0 (z∗).
Take the implicit derivatives of this expression with respect to α and arrive at:
dx∗
dα =
sM
∂p
∂x
. Inspection of signs verifies the above claim.
As is easily seen from equation (13), at a fixed wholesale and GC-price, the
end-user price faced by the consumers will increase from an increase of α, leading
to a reduction of the electricity consumption in equilibrium. As in the previous
case, the increase of α functions as an increase of an unit tax on electricity
consumption.
From the above analysis we can conclude that the uncertain and to some
extent perverse eﬀect of changes in the percentage requirement continue as the
markets are opened for trade. At least this is the case when the international
prices of the traded goods are given. We will now continue the analysis within
the context of a two-country model, in which the international wholesale- and
GC-prices are no longer fixed.
5 Two countries: The model
The following model is designed to capture a long run situation for the simulta-
neous functioning electricity market and the markets for GCs in two countries;
country A and country B. The variables we use are defined in Table 1:
Table 2: List of variables for the two-country model
Variable Country A Country B
consumer price of electricity pA pB
GC-price sA sB
wholesale price of electricity qA qB
consumption of electricity xA xB
generation of black electricity YA YB
quantity of black el. sold domestically yAA yBB
exported quantity of black el. yAB yBA
generation of green electricity (GCs) ZA ZB
quantity of green el. (GCs) sold domestically zAA zBB
exported quantity of green el. (GCs) zAB zBA
percentage of green electricity consumption αA αB
GC demand gA gB
We will apply the following set of general functions to describe the demand
and supply of electricity and GCs:
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The demand for electricity can be diﬀerent in the two countries and the
inverse demand functions are assumed to be:
In country A:
pA (xA) , with
∂pA (xA)
∂xA
= p
0
A (xA) < 0,
and in country B:
pB (xB) , with
∂pB (xB)
∂xB
= p
0
B (xB) < 0.
We will assume that the technologies used to generate black and green elec-
tricity may be diﬀerent in the two countries, but that the technologies are coun-
try specific. Thus, all the generators of black electricity in country A have the
same cost function, as will the generators of green electricity. The technologies
used by the producers in country B can be diﬀerent from those used in country
A and thus lead to comparative advantages/disadvantages in one or both of the
technologies.
The cost functions for the producers of black electricity are assumed given
by:
For the producers located in country A:
cA = cA (YA) , with c
0
A (YA) > 0 and c
00
A (YA) > 0,
and in country B:
cB = cB (YB) , with c
0
B (YB) > 0 and c
00
B (YB) > 0.
The technologies for green electricity generation in the two countries are
assumed to be specified by the following cost functions:
For the producers in country A:
hA = hA (ZA) , with h
0
A (ZA) > 0 and h
00
A (ZA) > 0,
and in country B:
hB = hB (ZB) , with h
0
B (ZB) > 0 and h
00
B (ZB) > 0.
5.1 Trade of electricity
Again, we start the analysis assuming that only electricity can be traded between
two countries. As in the previous section it is assumed that there are neither
any transaction costs associated by this trade, nor are there any transmission
limits between the countries. Thus, the markets for electricity in country A and
B can in this case be seen as a common market with a common wholesale price,
i.e. qA = qB = qM .
In this case, the producers of black electricity act as if they jointly maximize
the following profit functions:
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In country A:
Max π (YA) = qMYA − cA (YA) , s.t. YA ≥ 0,
and in country B:
Max π (YB) = qMYB − cB (YB) , s.t. YB ≥ 0.
Under perfect competition, the first order conditions in this case must imply
that in equilibrium the marginal cost of the producers of black electricity in
both countries are equal to the common wholesale price of electricity. Thus, we
have:
qM = c
0
A (YA) = c
0
B (YB) .
The generators of green electricity now jointly act as to maximize:
In country A:
Max π (zA) = [qM + sA]ZA − hA (ZA) , s.t. ZA ≥ 0,
and in country B:
Max π (zB) = [qM + sB]ZB − hB (ZB) , s.t. ZB ≥ 0.
The first order conditions obviously are just:
In country A:
qM + sA = h
0
A (ZA) ,
and in country B:
qM + sB = h
0
B (ZB) .
The distribution companies jointly act as to maximize:
In country A:
Max π (xA) = pAxA − [qM + αAsA]xA,
and in country B:
Max π (xB) = pBxB − [qM + αBsB]xB.
This yields the following first order conditions:
In country A:
pA = qM + αAsA,
and in country B
pB = qM + αBsB .
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The demand for GCs is as usual given by:
In country A:
gA = αAxA,
and in country B:
gB = αBxB.
5.1.1 Electricity trade
As we have a common market for electricity in this case, the market balance
condition for electricity can be expressed as:
YA + ZA + YB + ZB ≥ xA + xB,
i.e. total supply of electricity from the generators in country A and B must
be at least as large as total demand for electricity in these two countries. How-
ever, when characterizing the equilibrium for the two countries it is convenient
to separate the generated quantities of black electricity in each country into
quantity sold to consumers in the home country and electricity sold to the con-
sumers in the other country. For the quantity of black electricity generated in
country A, YA, we then have YA = yAA + yAB, with yAA being the quantity
sold to domestic consumers, while yAB represents the quantity exported to the
consumers in country B. In the same way we have YB = yBB + yBA.
Export of electricity will happen when the domestic supply exceeds domestic
demand. Obviously electricity will be exported only if there exist a supply deficit
in the other country. In this model of only two countries, the export from one
of the countries must equal the import of the other country. Thus, only one of
the trade variables yAB and yBA can be positive in equilibrium, the other will
always be zero, i.e. we have the trade of electricity specified as:
y∗AB = max (0;Y
∗
A + Z
∗
A − x∗A) ,
and
y∗BA = max (0;Y
∗
B + Z
∗
B − x∗B) .
5.1.2 Equilibrium for the case of trade of electricity
Assuming that c
0
A (Y
∗
A), h
0
A (Z
∗
A), c
0
B (Y
∗
B) and h
0
B (Z
∗
B) are representing the
aggregate marginal cost functions in the two countries, we have the following
result for the key variables in equilibrium in the case of trade of electricity:
In country A:
pA (x
∗
A) = q
∗
M + αAs
∗
A (17)
x∗A = y
∗
AA + Z
∗
A + y
∗
BA =
Z∗A
αA
(18)
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q∗M + s
∗
A = h
0
A (Z
∗
A) (19)
q∗M = c
0
A (Y
∗
A) (20)
In country B:
pB (x
∗
B) = q
∗
M + αBs
∗
B (21)
x∗B = y
∗
BB + Z
∗
B + y
∗
AB =
Z∗B
αB
(22)
q∗M + s
∗
B = h
0
B (Z
∗
B) (23)
q∗M = c
0
B (Y
∗
B) (24)
5.1.3 Analysis
We will focus the analysis on the eﬀects of an increase of the percentage require-
ment in one of the countries. We do this because it gives a better understanding
of the interactions between the countries. Neither will it be necessary for the
countries involved in the trade to have the same percentage requirement. The
analysis will then investigate the eﬀects on the generation of black and green
electricity, and on consumption, in both countries, from an increase of the per-
centage requirement in country A.6
Proposition 4 shows some interesting results. In country A, an increase of
the percentage requirement will definitely lead to a reduced demand for black
electricity, which means that the wholesale price of electricity falls, see equation
(20). Note that we use the symbol Y , representing the total supply of black
electricity to the common market from the two countries, i.e. Y = YA + YB. A
common electricity market with a common wholesale price must imply that the
eﬀect on the generation of black electricity from an increase of αA is the same
in both countries. Thus,
³
dY ∗
dαA
´
< 0 means that both
³
dY ∗A
dαA
´
and
³
dY ∗B
dαA
´
are
negative. The eﬀects on the generation of green electricity and on electricity
consumption in country A are again indeterminate, as they were both under
autarky and in the case of trade of electricity at a given international wholesale
price. Thus, the eﬀects with respect to country A are as in the previous cases.
Within the two-country model, however, also country B will be aﬀected by
a change of the percentage requirement in country A. As already mentioned
above, the generation of black electricity will be reduced also in this country
6 It should be noted that the results would be the same if we looked at a change of the
percentage requirement in country B. Of course the analysis could also be made assuming that
the countries have a common percentage requirement, but this will not give any additional
information. The eﬀects of changes in a common α will be identical to the eﬀects on the key
variables in country A from a change in αA.
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as we now have a common market for electricity. However, and this is a quite
surprising result, both the generation of green electricity and the consumption
of electricity in country B will actually increase from the increase in αA.7
Proposition 4 In the case of trade of electricity in the two-country model,
the percentage requirement, αA, has the following eﬀects: i)
³
dY ∗
dαA
´
< 0, ii)
sign
³
dz∗A
dαA
´
and sign
³
dx∗A
dαA
´
are indeterminate, and iii)
³
dz∗B
dαA
´
> 0 and
³
dx∗B
dαA
´
>
0.
Proof. i) Inserting (19) and (20) into (17) yields the electricity price in
country A as a linear combination of marginal costs of the two groups of gener-
ation technologies in equilibrium, i.e. pA (x∗A) = (1− αA)C
0
(Y ∗)+αAh
0
A (z
∗
A).
Take the implicit derivatives of this expression with respect to αA and arrive
at: dY
∗
dαA
=
(1−αA)+x∗A
h
αAh
00
A(z
∗
A)−α2Ah
00
A(z
∗
A)
i
D ,
dz∗B
dαA
= −αB(1−αB)C
00
(Y ∗)x∗A
αAD
and
dx∗B
dαA
= − (1−αB)C
00
(Y ∗)x∗A
D , with D =
∂pA
∂xA
− (1− αA)2C00 (Y ∗)− α2Ah
00
A (z
∗
A) < 0.
Inspection of signs verifies the above claim.
ii) To show that
³
dz∗A
dαA
´
and
³
dx∗A
dαA
´
are indeterminate, it suﬃces to give
examples satisfying the assumptions of the model. Examples are provided in
appendix B.
iii) Inserting (23) and (24) into (21) yields the electricity price in coun-
try B as a linear combination of marginal costs of the two groups of genera-
tion technologies in equilibrium, i.e. pB (x∗B) = (1− αB)C
0
(Y ∗) + αBh
0
B (z
∗
B).
Take the implicit derivatives of this expression with respect to αA and arrive
at: dz
∗
B
dαA
= −αB(1−αB)C
00
(Y )xA
αAD
and dx
∗
B
dαA
= − (1−αB)C
00
(Y )xA
D , with D =
∂pA
∂xA
−
(1− αA)2C00 (Y ∗) − α2Ah
00
A (z
∗
A) < 0. Inspection of signs verifies the above
claims.
In order to understand and explain this surprising result with respect to
the increase of the generation of green electricity in country B, it is enough to
explain why the electricity demand in country B, xB , must increase. As there is
no trade of GCs in this case, an increase of xB must necessarily imply an increase
in the generation of green electricity in country B to cover the increased demand
for certificates. In order to obtain a contradiction, assume that the opposite is
true, i.e. dx
∗
B
dαA
≤ 0. For this to be the case, the end user price of electricity in
country B, pB, must be at least as high as before the increase of αA. As we
know that qM is reduced and αB is unchanged, we see from equation (21) that
dpB
dαA
≥ 0 must imply that sB is increased by at least 1αB times the decrease
of qM . As αB < 1, this must imply that the price per unit received by the
7 In the proofs for the cases involving trade of electricity we will assume that C (Y ) repre-
sents the horizontal sum of C (YA) and C (YB), with Y = YA + YB being the total quantity
of black electricity generated in the two countries. This assumption is straight forward as
we know that the common electricity market induces a common wholesale price of electricity,
qM , in the two countries, which means that we have qM = C
0 ¡
Y ∗A
¢
= C
0 ¡
Y ∗B
¢
in equilibrium.
Thus we also have C
0
(Y ) = C
0
(YA)+ C
0
(YB) and C
00
(Y ) = C
00
(YA)+ C
00
(YB).
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producers of green electricity in country B, qM +sB, has increased as compared
to before the increase of αA. This means that the generation of green electricity
in this country has increased. However, this contradicts the above assumption
of dx
∗
B
dαA
≤ 0, as a non-increase of the electricity consumption in country B is not
consistent with an increase of the generation of green electricity in this country.
The increase of the percentage requirement in country A must therefore imply
an increase of the electricity consumption, and thus also in the generation of
green electricity, in country B.
We also note that even if the generation of black electricity falls also in
country B, the supply of black electricity to the consumers in country B will
increase. The reduction in generated quantity is therefore due to the reduced
net export of black electricity from country B to country A.
Thus, we have the paradoxical situation that while an increase of the percent-
age requirement in country A may actually lead to a reduction of the generation
of green electricity in country A, it will always increase the generation of green
electricity in country B
5.2 Trade of GCs
Assume now that only GCs can be traded, while the market for electricity is
closed. In this case, the physical electricity must be sold domestically while the
GCs can be sold in a common market at the common GC-price sM .8
The only changes of the objective functions and the first order conditions
from the previous case are the replacements of the common wholesale price,
qM , with the domestic wholesale prices, qA and qB , and the introduction of a
common GC-price, sM , instead of the country specific GC-price, sA and sB.
5.2.1 GC-trade
As the GC prices in the two countries are equal, the trade of GCs will be given
by the following two expressions in equilibrium:
Export of GCs from country A:
z∗AB = max (0;Z
∗
A − αAx∗A) ,
and from country B:
z∗BA = max (0;Z
∗
B − αBx∗B) .
In this case, there will be export of GCs if the domestic supply is larger than
the domestic demand. As in the case of trade of electricity, only one of these
trade variable can be positive in equilibrium in our two-country model.
8The introduction of GC-price bounds can have the eﬀect as to make the GC-prices diﬀerent
beween the trading countries. This will be treated later in this paper.
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5.2.2 Equilibrium for the case of trade of GCs
In the case of trade of GCs we will then have the following competitive equilib-
rium solution for the key variables:
In country A:
pA (x
∗
A) = q
∗
A + αAs
∗
M (25)
x∗A = Y
∗
A + z
∗
AA =
z∗AA + z
∗
BA
αA
(26)
q∗A + s
∗
M = h
0
(Z∗A) (27)
q∗A = c
0
(Y ∗A) (28)
In country B:
pB (x
∗
B) = q
∗
B + αBs
∗
M (29)
x∗B = Y
∗
B + z
∗
BB =
z∗BB + z
∗
AB
αB
(30)
q∗B + s
∗
M = h
0
(Z∗B) (31)
q∗B = c
0
(Y ∗B) (32)
5.2.3 Analysis
As is shown in Proposition 5, it turns out that increasing αA as usually leads to a
reduction in the demand for black electricity in country A. However, in contrast
to the case of trade of electricity, the eﬀect on generation of black electricity in
country B is now indeterminate. Actually, in this case it is only the eﬀect on
generation of black electricity in country A that is certain. All the other key
variables in both countries are indeterminate.
Proposition 5 In the case of trade of GCs in the two-country model, the
percentage requirement, αA, has the following eﬀects: i)
³
dy∗A
dαA
´
< 0, and ii)
sign
³
dz∗A
dαA
´
, sign
³
dx∗A
dαA
´
, sign
³
dy∗B
dαA
´
, sign
³
dz∗B
dαA
´
and sign
³
dx∗B
dαA
´
are all in-
determinate.
Proof. i) Inserting (27) and (28) into (25) yields the electricity price as a
linear combination of marginal costs of the two groups of generation technologies
in equilibrium, i.e. pA (x∗A) = (1− αA) c
0
(y∗A) + αAh
0
A (z
∗
A). Take the implicit
derivative of this expression with respect to αA and arrive at: dY
∗
dαA
= (1−αA)s
∗
M
D ,
with D = ∂pA∂xA −(1− αA)
2
C
00
(Y ∗)−α2Ah
00
A (z
∗
A) < 0. Inspection of signs verifies
the above claim.
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ii) Examples satisfying the assumptions of the model are provided in appendix
C.
The intuition behind the indeterminate eﬀects is that as the electricity mar-
kets are now closed, the change of the percentage requirement in country A only
aﬀects directly the common GC-price, while the wholesale price is not directly
aﬀected in country B. As the per unit price received by the producers of green
electricity consists of both the wholesale price and the GC-price, the remunera-
tion to the producers can be diﬀerent in the two countries even if there is trade
of GCs. The eﬀects on the wholesale price and the end user price in country
B are also uncertain. The result is then that the only certain eﬀect is that the
generation of black electricity in country A decreases.
5.3 Trade of electricity and GCs
We will now combine the two previous cases assuming that the markets are open
for trade of both electricity and certificates. Both the wholesale- and GC-price
will then be common between the countries, leading to a replacement of qA and
qB with qM , and sA and sB with sM , in the objective functions and the first
order conditions.
5.3.1 Equilibrium for the case of trade of electricity and GCs
As in the previous case, the relative share of green electricity generated in one
country can diﬀer from the percentage requirement due to the possibility of
import or export of GCs. This is reflected in equations (30) and (34). The
equilibrium will then be:
In country A:
pA (x
∗
A) = q
∗
M + αAs
∗
M (33)
x∗A = y
∗
AA + z
∗
AA + y
∗
BA =
z∗AA + z
∗
BA
αA
(34)
q∗M + s
∗
M = h
0
(Z∗A) (35)
q∗M = c
0
(Y ∗A) (36)
In country B:
pB (x
∗
B) = q
∗
M + αBs
∗
M (37)
x∗B = y
∗
BB + z
∗
BB + y
∗
AB =
z∗BB + z
∗
AB
α
(38)
q∗M + s
∗
M = h
0
(Z∗B) (39)
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q∗M = c
0
(Y ∗B) (40)
5.3.2 Analysis
As shown in Proposition 6, we have that increasing αA will reduce the demand
for black electricity and therefore the common wholesale price decreases, leading
to a drop in the generation of black electricity in both countries. The other two
eﬀects in country A, i.e.
³
dz∗A
dαA
´
,
³
dx∗A
dαA
´
turns out to be indeterminate, as they
have been in the two previous cases in the two-country model. In contrast to the
trade of electricity case, we find that the additional opening of the GC market
will mean that it is no longer certain that the increase of αA will induce in
increase of the generation of green electricity in country B. Neither can we say
anything certain about the eﬀect on end use consumption in country B.
Proposition 6 In the case of trade of both electricity and GCs in the two-
country model, the percentage requirement, αA, has the following eﬀects: i)³
dY ∗A
dαA
´
< 0, while ii) sign
³
dz∗A
dαA
´
, sign
³
dx∗A
dαA
´
, sign
³
dz∗B
dαA
´
and sign
³
dx∗B
dαA
´
are all indeterminate.
Proof. i) Inserting (35) and (36) into (33) yields the electricity price in
country A as a linear combination of marginal costs of the two groups of gener-
ation technologies in equilibrium, i.e. pA (x∗A) = (1− αA)C
0
(Y ∗)+αAh
0
A (z
∗
A).
Take the implicit derivative of this expression with respect to αA and arrive at:
dY ∗
dαA
=
(1−αA)
h
s∗M+αAx
∗
Ah
00
A(z
∗
A)
i
D , withD =
∂pA
∂xA
−(1− αA)2C00 (Y ∗)−α2Ah
00
A (z
∗
A) <
0. Inspection of signs verifies the above claim.
iii) Examples satisfying the assumptions of the model are provided in appen-
dix D.
So far in this paper we have assumed that the GC-price is decided by the
market. However, as mentioned in the introduction, many of the GC-systems
discussed in diﬀerent countries include price bounds for the GC-price. We will
now place the focus on this other policy variable of the GC-system. The GC-
price bounds will function as to restrict the variations in the GC-price. An
upper price bound should be of particular significance in an early phase of a
GC-system. At the time of introduction, the technologies for generation of green
electricity will probably be quite immature and it may be diﬃcult to generate
enough green electricity to satisfy the percentage requirement at a reasonable
cost. In such a case the upper GC-price bound will come into eﬀect as the
consumers can fulfill their percentage requirement buying GCs, or really paying
a fine, to the State to be allowed to consume more electricity than α times the
amount of GCs they have bought at the GC market. The lower price bound
should be more relevant in a more mature GC-system to secure a minimum
payment to the producers of green electricity. As argued earlier, a GC system
that in the long run generates a GC-price at one of the GC-price bounds should
rather be replaced by a system based on direct per unit subsidies. However, we
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may have a situation in which the price bounds are binding for shorter periods.
Therefore, and also for the sake of completeness, we will now briefly discuss the
importance of the price bounds with respect to our analysis.
6 Eﬀects of GC-price bounds
We will discuss the eﬀects of the price bounds from two diﬀerent perspectives.
First, we look at how the authorities can directly regulate the GC-price, up-
ward or downwards, by changing the price bounds. Second, we will see if the
comparative statics results may change if one of the price bounds is binding
when the percentage requirement is changed. We will limit our discussion to
the two-country model.9 The following symbols are used to represent the GC-
price bounds: sA and sB are the lower price bounds in country A and B, while
sA and sB represent the upper bounds.
6.1 Price bounds in the case of trade of electricity
Assuming that we are in an equilibrium in which the GC-prices in both countries
are within the price bounds, and that the authorities in one of the countries, say
country A, think the current GC-price is ”wrong”. They can then use the price
bounds to either increase or decrease the GC-price. An increase will happen if
the lower price bound in country A is set to be higher that the current GC-price
in country A, i.e. sA > s
∗
A. Reducing the upper price bound below the current
GC-price will, on the other hand, reduce s∗A. As we are in the two-country
model, this will aﬀect the equilibrium in both countries, due to the common
wholesale price of electricity, qM .
An increase of s∗A means that qM is reduced. This is because it gets more
expensive for the consumers in country A to fulfill the percentage requirement
and they will therefore reduce their demand for electricity. The generation of
green electricity in country A will, however, increase, as the producers of green
electricity can sell as many certificates as they want to the authorities at the
given minimum GC-price, which is higher than the former equilibrium GC-
price. It is therefore worth noting that the positive eﬀect on the generation of
green electricity in country A is financed completely by the authorities, which
illustrates the point that a GC-price at a price bound is equal to a direct subsidy.
In country B, the eﬀect on demand is positive, as they only face a lower wholesale
price. The increased demand will obviously also induce higher generation of
green electricity in country B.
A decrease of s∗A, by lowering the upper price bound, will have the complete
opposite eﬀect. The demand in country A will increase, thus leading to an
increase of qM and a larger generation of black electricity. The lower GC-price,
however, leads to a reduction of the generation of green electricity in country
A as the consumers now can buy the necessary GCs from the authorities at the
9The eﬀects of increasing the percentage requirment in the cases of a binding GC-price
bound under autarky is treated in Amundsen and Nese (2002).
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given maximum price. The eﬀect in country B is obviously reduced demand
and lower generation of green electricity. The increased generation of black
electricity will just increase the net export of electricity from country B to
country A.
6.2 Price bounds in the case involving trade of GCs
In order to illustrate the interaction between the countries in the cases involving
trade of GCs, we will assume that the price bounds are diﬀerent in the two
countries. In these cases, the eﬀects of an eventual binding price bounds will
have to be considered carefully, as this will give rise to diﬀerent GC-prices in
the two countries.10 With an open GC-market, a diﬀerence between the GC-
prices will mean that all the certificates are sold in the market with the highest
GC-price. For such a situation to be a possible equilibrium it must be so that
the lowest GC-price must be equal to that country’s upper price bound. This
is because no certificates will be sold in this country, which means that the
consumers must buy their GCs from the authorities. Such a situation is only
consistent with a GC-price at the upper bound. In the other country, i.e. the
country with the highest GC-price, the price can in principle be either at one
of the price bound or between the bounds.
Increasing the GC-price in one of the countries, e.g. country A, by increasing
the lower price bound, sA, above the valid GC-price will only generate a possible
equilibrium if sA > sB . In equilibrium, we must therefore have s
∗
A = sA,
s∗B = sB and sA > sB. This will induce higher GC-prices in both countries.
The eﬀects are reduced demand and generation of black electricity, but increased
generation of green electricity in both countries. Again, as in the case of trade
of electricity, this increase will solely be at the expense of the authorities in the
country initiating the GC-price increase.
Assume then that country A wants to reduce the s∗A by setting the upper
price bound, sA, below the current equilibrium GC-price. We then get sA <
sB.The generators of green electricity will then want to sell all their GCs in
country B. This will of course put a downward pressure on sB. It is then
possible that the GC-price in country B is reduced below the new sA again so
we get a new equilibrium price where the GC-prices are again equal, but at a
lower level than before. Alternatively, we get a new equilibrium where the s∗B =
sB (this conditions that sA < sB) or sB < s
∗
B < sB. This will obviously depend
on both elasticities and the level of the price bounds. The eﬀect will be a lower
GC-price in both countries, leading to increased demand, increased generation
of black electricity, and reduced generation of green electricity in both countries.
10Of course, equal price bounds in the two coutries would mean that the GC-prices would
be equal also in the case of binding price bounds. However, the eﬀects with respect to our
analysis would then just be equal in the two countries.
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6.3 Comparative statics in cases of binding price bounds
We will now look at how the comparative statics results are aﬀected if the price
bounds are binding in one of the countries when the percentage requirement is
increased. In general, the eﬀect is that the GC-price in the country in which
the price bound is binding will not be aﬀected by the change of the percentage
requirement. In the above discussion we argued that the existence of binding
GC-price bounds are leading to diﬀerent GC-prices between the countries in
cases where the GC market is open. For these to be possible equilibria, strict,
and to some extent quite unrealistic, conditions had to be fulfilled. We will
therefore limit our discussion in this part to the case of trade of electricity.
6.3.1 Trade of electricity
In the case where the price bounds were not binding we had the following result
(see Proposition 4):
³
dY ∗
dαA
´
< 0, sign
³
dz∗A
dαA
´
and sign
³
dx∗A
dαA
´
were indetermi-
nate, while
³
dz∗B
dαA
´
and
³
dx∗B
dαA
´
were both positive.
As an illustration, assume that s∗A is at one of it’s price bounds and that it
remains there also after the marginal increase of αA. First of all, the wholesale
price, qM , will still fall as it did before. The direct eﬀect of the binding price
bound is that s∗A is unaﬀected by the increase of αA. This means that the
generation of green electricity will definitely be reduced as the reduction in the
wholesale price, qM , is not compensated at all by an increasing GC-price. The
eﬀect on electricity consumption is still indeterminate in country A in this case.
An unchanged s∗A and a reduced qM has a positive eﬀect on demand, while the
increase of αA has a negative eﬀect. In country B, however, the eﬀects are going
in the same direction as they were in Proposition 4. In this case of a binding
price bound in country A we thus have
³
dz∗A
dαA
´
> 0. Otherwise, the results are
as in Proposition 4.
Assume then that s∗B is at one of it’s price bounds. The reduction of qM
will, as s∗B is fixed, mean that the generation of green electricity in country B
in this case will be reduced. However, the end user price is also reduced so the
electricity consumption increases in country B. The increased demand will be
covered by a reduced net export of electricity from country B to country A. The
eﬀects in country A are the same as in Proposition 4. Thus, we have
³
dz∗B
dαA
´
< 0,
but otherwise the same results as in Proposition 4.
7 Summary and concluding remarks
In this article we have mainly focused on the percentage requirement, which
is the variable that is supposed to function as the policy instrument aﬀecting
the level of green electricity in end use consumption in a Green Certificate
system. We have investigated the eﬀect of changing the percentage requirement
in diﬀerent market settings from autarky via trade at given international prices
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and finally looking at trade between two countries where the international prices
are aﬀected by the trade. When looking at trade, we have done this step by step
in the sense that we started with trade of only electricity before moving to trade
of only certificates, and finally opening the markets for both these goods. For
each case we have derived theoretical expressions or used numerical examples
to prove the eﬀects on generation of black and green electricity and on end use
consumption from an increase of the percentage requirement. Our results are
summarized in the table below.
Table 3: Summary of the results
dy∗A
dαA
dz∗A
dαA
dx∗A
dαA
dy∗B
dαA
dz∗B
dαA
dx∗B
dαA
Autarky − ? ?
Trade at given international prices
Trade of electricity 0 ? −
Trade of GCs − − −
Trade of electricity and GCs 0 0 −
Trade in a two-country model
Trade of electricity − ? ? − + +
Trade of GCs − ? ? ? ? ?
Trade of electricity and GCs − ? ? − ? ?
From the above table we take particular note of the more or less paradoxical
result that in neither of the cases can an increase of the percentage requirement
in one of the countries guarantee an increase of the level of green electricity
consumption in the country itself. This quite surprising result is followed up
in the two-country analysis in which an increase of the percentage requirement
in country A can, and in the case of trade of electricity always will, induce an
increase of the generation of green electricity in country B. We can then have
a situation where the increase of the percentage requirement in one country
have a negative eﬀect on green electricity generation in the country itself, but
a positive eﬀect in the other country.
An additional result that further increases the impression of the GC system
as a system generating strange and perverse results was found in the case of
trade of only GCs at a given international GC-price. It was shown that a
country’s generation of green electricity in this case would be maximized by
setting the percentage requirement equal to zero. This would mean that the
whole generation of green electricity in this country is financed from abroad.
The analysis also showed that the possibility to use the GC-price bounds as
an additional policy variable in a GC system had limited eﬀects.
Opening of the markets for electricity and GCs can to some extent reduce
potential problems connected to market power, but this paper has shown that
the indeterminate eﬀect on green electricity generation from increasing the per-
centage requirement found under autarky continues when opening for trade.
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The results from this analysis should therefore further contribute to the
warnings to the countries considering to implement GC systems; a great amount
of consideration should be done before implementation as the functioning of
these systems seem to be far more complex than it may seem at first glance.
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Appendix
A A numerical model
In this appendix we will present a simple numerical model satisfying the as-
sumptions we have made about the electricity market. The model will be used
to provide proofs for the existence of some of the results for the two-country
model referred to in Proposition 4, 5 and 6 in this article. We assume the
following functions:
The inverse demand functions are given by:
For country A:
pA (xA) = aA − bAxA, with aA, bA > 0,
and for country B:
pB (xB) = aB − bBxB, with aB, bB > 0.
This gives falling demand curves as we have:
p
0
A (xA) = −bA < 0
and
p
0
B (xB) = −bB < 0
The technologies for generation of black electricity are summarized in the
following increasing cost functions:
For country A:
cA (YA) = kAY
2
A, where kA > 0,
with
c
0
A (YA) = 2kAYA > 0 and c
00
A (YA) = 2kA ≥ 0.
For country B:
cB (YB) = kBY
2
B, where kB > 0,
with
c
0
B (YB) = 2kBYB > 0 and c
00
B (YB) = 2kB ≥ 0.
The producers of green electricity have the following cost functions:
For country A:
hA (ZA) =
cA
2
Z2A + gAZA, where cA, gA > 0,
with
h
0
A (ZA) = cAZA + gA > 0 and h
00
A (zA) = cA ≥ 0.
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For country B:
hB (zB) =
cB
2
Z2B + gBZB, where cB, gB > 0,
with
h
0
B (ZB) = cBZB + gB > 0 and h
00
B (zB) = cB ≥ 0.
By running this model we can find the competitive equilibrium solution for
the key variables in both countries for each of the three diﬀerent ”trade regimes”.
B Proposition 5
According to Proposition 4, trade of electricity in the two-country model pro-
duces indeterminate eﬀects with respect to the eﬀects of a change of the per-
centage requirement in country A on the generation of green electricity and
the electricity consumption in country A, i.e.
³
dzA
dαA
´
and
³
dxA
dαA
´
were both
indeterminate.
The following parameter values are used to generate the equilibrium solution
in the case where only the electricity market is open:
a b c g k
Country A 200 0, 75 30 100 3
Country B 200 0, 75 30 100 2
The results showing the eﬀect of increasing αA from two diﬀerent levels are
presented in the tables below.
Country A
αA qM sA pA YA zA xA yAB
0.2 137.75 177.02 173.15 22.96 7.16 35.79 0
0.21 135.75 182.33 174.04 22.63 7.27 34.62 0
0.5 38 300.18 188.09 6.33 7.94 15.88 0
0.51 37 297.11 188.52 6.17 7.8 15.3 0
Country B
αA qM sB pB YB zB xB YBA
0.2 137.75 177.02 173.15 34.44 7.16 35.79 5.8
0.21 135.75 183.94 172.54 33.94 7.32 36.62 4.65
0.5 38 300.18 188.09 9.5 7.94 15.88 1.56
0.51 37 302.9 188.05 9.25 7.97 15.94 1.28
Thus, the first two rows of the table above show that the generation of
green electricity in country A increases from 7.16 to 7.27 when the percentage
requirement in country A increases from 0.2 to 0.21. The two last rows, on the
other hand, show the opposite eﬀect as zA there will decrease from an increase
of αA. We have thus shown that
³
dzA
dαA
´
is indeterminate.
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The example above also illustrates the point that even if the generation
of black electricity decreases in both countries from an increase of αA, the
consumption of black electricity will still increase in country B as its export
of electricity to country A has been reduced by more than the reduction in
generated quantity.
We now want to prove that the electricity consumption in country A van
go in both directions if the percentage requirement in this country is increased.
The above example has already that we may have
³
dxA
dαA
´
< 0. In order to show³
dxA
dαA
´
< 0, we assume the following parameter values for our example:
a b c g k
Country A 205 0.75 10 200 5
Country B 180 20 10 200 200
The result from changing αA from 0.2 to 0.21 is presented in the tables
below.
Country A
αA qM sA pA YA zA xA yAB
0.2 174.21 70.37 188.28 17.42 4.46 22.29 0
0.21 172.7 74.14 188.27 17.27 4.68 22.31 0
Country B
αA qM sB pB YB zB xB yBA
0.2 174.21 25.85 179.38 0.44 0.01 0.03 0.41
0.21 172.7 27.48 178.2 0.43 0.02 0.09 0.36
We have thus proved that
³
dxA
dαA
´
is indeterminate in the case of trade of
electricity in the two-country model.
C Proposition 6
According to Proposition 5,
³
dZA
dαA
´
,
³
dxA
dαA
´
,
³
dyB
dαA
´
,
³
dzB
dαA
´
and
³
dxB
dαA
´
are all
indeterminate in the case of trade of only GCs in the two-country model.
The following parameter values are used to generate the equilibrium solution
in the case where only the GC market is open:
a b c g k
Country A 200 0.75 50 200 3
Country B 200 0.75 30 100 3
The results from changing αA from 0.2 to 0.21 is presented in the tables
below.
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Country A
αA sM qA pA yA ZA xA zAB
0.2 214.5 137.62 180.52 22.94 3.04 25.98 0
0.21 219.0 134.85 180.84 22.47 3.08 25.55 0
Country B
αA sM qB pB yB ZB xB zBA
0.2 214.5 134.12 177.02 22.35 8.29 30.64 2.16
0.21 219.0 133.24 177.04 22.21 8.41 30.61 2.29
The above results thus show that we may have:
³
dZA
dαA
´
> 0,
³
dxA
dαA
´
< 0,³
dyB
dαA
´
< 0,
³
dzB
dαA
´
> 0 and
³
dxB
dαA
´
< 0.
Assume now the following parameter values:
a b c g k
Country A 200 0.75 50 100 3
Country B 200 0.75 30 50 3
The results from changing αA from 0.5 to 0.51 is presented in the tables
below.
Country A
αA sM qA pA yA ZA xA zAB
0.5 293.3 44.25 190.9 7.38 4.75 12.13 0
0.51 29.25 42.05 191.23 7.01 4.69 11.7 0
Country B
αA sM qB pB yB ZB xB zBA
0.5 293.3 41.1 187.75 6.85 9.48 16.33 1.31
0.51 29.25 41.47 187.72 6.91 9.47 16.38 1.28
These results then show that we may have
³
dZA
dαA
´
< 0,
³
dyB
dαA
´
> 0,
³
dzB
dαA
´
<
0 and
³
dxB
dαA
´
> 0.
It then remains only to show that we may have
³
dxA
dαA
´
> 0. To prove this,
we assume the following parameters:
a b c g k
Country A 205 0.75 10 200 5
Country B 180 20 10 200 200
The results are as presented below:
Country A
αA sM qA pA yA ZA xA zAB
0.2 61.2 176.67 188.91 17.67 3.79 21.45 0
0.21 64 175.44 188.88 17.54 3.94 21.49 0
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Country B
αA sM qB pB yB ZB xB zBA
0.2 61.2 146.02 158.26 0.37 0.72 1.09 0.5
0.21 64 144.0 156.8 0.36 0.8 1.16 0.57
Thus, we have shown that it is possible to have
³
dxA
dαA
´
> 0.
The above examples have then proved that
³
dZA
dαA
´
,
³
dxA
dαA
´
,
³
dyB
dαA
´
,
³
dzB
dαA
´
and
³
dxB
dαA
´
are all indeterminate.
D Proposition 7
According to Proposition 6,
³
dzA
dαA
´
,
³
dxA
dαA
´
and
³
dzB
dαA
´
are all indeterminate
when both the electricity and the GC markets are open in the two-country
model. The examples below will prove that this can be the case.
Assume first the following parameter values:
a b c g k
Country A 200 0.75 50 200 2
Country B 200 0.75 30 100 8
The results are:
Country A
αA qM sM pA YA ZA xA yAB zAB
0.2 139.2 202.1 179.62 34.8 2.83 27.17 10.45 0
0.21 137.3 207.39 180.8 34.31 2.89 25.6 11.61 0
0.5 35.75 311.7 191.6 8.94 2.95 11.2 0.69 0
0.51 35 310.4 193.3 8.75 2.91 8.93 2.73 0
Country B
αA qM sM pB YB ZB xB yBA zBA
0.2 139.2 202.1 179.62 8.7 8.04 27.17 0 2.61
0.21 137.3 207.39 178.73 8.58 8.15 28.36 0 2.48
0.5 35.75 311.7 191.6 2.23 8.25 11.2 0 2.65
0.51 35 310.4 190.2 2.19 8.18 13.07 0 1.65
These results from the first two rows show that the following is possible:³
dzA
dαA
´
> 0,
³
dxA
dαA
´
< 0 and
³
dzB
dαA
´
> 0. From the last two rows we can see
that also
³
dzA
dαA
´
< 0 and
³
dzB
dαA
´
< 0 are possible results.
It then remains to show that we may have
³
dxA
dαA
´
> 0 and
³
dx∗B
dαA
´
< 0. To
prove this, we assume the following parameters:
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a b c g k
Country A 205 0.75 10 200 5
Country B 205 20 10 200 5
In addition we have assumed αB = 0.55.
The results are:
Country A
αA qM sM pA YA ZA xA yAB zAB
0.2 159.1 80.86 175.22 15.91 3.99 39.7 0 0
0.21 157.4 84.63 175.12 15.74 4.2 39.84 0 0
Country B
αA qM sM pB YB ZB xB yBA zBA
0.2 159.1 80.86 203.52 15.91 3.99 0.07 19.82 3.95
0.21 157.4 84.63 203.9 15.74 4.2 0.06 19.88 4.17
Thus, it is also possible to have
³
dxA
dαA
´
> 0 and
³
dx∗B
dαA
´
< 0.
We have then from the above examples proved that
³
dzA
dαA
´
,
³
dxA
dαA
´
,
³
dzB
dαA
´
and
³
dx∗B
dαA
´
are all indeterminate when both the electricity and the GC markets
are open in the two-country model.
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